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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann., Section 78-2a-3(2)(g), and Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4
of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and in specifically failing to find that once a
party,

the Plaintiff

herein, repudiated

the

contract, the non-

breaching party, the Defendant herein, was relieved from performing
and could pursue his remedies for breach of contract?
2.

Did

the

Court

err

in

failing

to

find

that

once

anticipatory repudiation has occurred, the Defendant in this matter
was entitled to bring suit on the contract at any time within the
statutory period of limitations?
3.

Did the trial court err in its ruling with regard to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in failing to make Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment specifically
reciting

the facts and theories relied upon in granting

summary

judgment?
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CASE LAW
There are no determinative rules or case law that govern the
disposition of this Appeal.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I
NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

an

action

to

determine

the

enforceability

of an

agreement to purchase property and thus determine the validity of a
Notice

of

Interest

filed

on

the

property

in question

by

the

Defendant.
II
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff, Wilford Hooley, is approximately

seventy-five

years of age (R. 32), and recognized when his deposition was taken,
that he was not as sharp as he used to be. (R. 33)
The Plaintiff, in his lifetime had sold only one other parcel of
property, a former home, to his son. (R. 33-4)
The parcel of property involved in this matter is located at
approximately 720 West 200 South in Lindon, Utah County, Utah and is
more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 7.44 chains East and 0.50 chains North of the
Southwest Corner of Section 33, in Township 5 South, Range
2 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in Utah County,
State of Utah, thence North 372.24 feet; thence North
85°52 f 30" East 485.5 feet; thence South 158.50 feet;
thence South 40° West 355 feet to road; thence West 240
feet to the place of beginning.
Together with any and all water rights appurtenant thereto
and together with any and all improvements thereunto
belonging.
2

The property

consists of 3.36

acres and has Cobbler Ditch

Company water appurtenant to it. (R. 35)
In June of 1987, the Plaintiff was living alone in a home
located

approximately

a block

to

a block-and-a-half

from

the

Defendant, Clinton Barter. (R. 39-41)
The Plaintiff and Defendant had met working in the pipe trade
and

at the

time

they negotiated

the

transaction

involving

the

property had known each other for more than eleven (11) years. (R.
40)

The Plaintiff characterized the relationship as "friendly" in

his deposition (R. 49)
Approximately one week prior to the agreement of June 28, 1987,
the Plaintiff and Defendant met to discuss the possible sale of the
Plaintiff's

property.

(R. 42)

The meeting

took

place

at the

Plaintiff's residence and on the property in question. (R. 42)
parties

discussed

generally

the

dimensions

of

The

the property and

general price terms. (R. 44-5)
The parties then met two additional times during the next week
to discuss the pending transaction.

(R. 46)

During those meetings,

the Plaintiff was debating whether or not to accept the Defendant's
offer of $20,000.00 (R. 47).
The Plaintiff claimed that he was unsure of the value of the
property but knew that approximately one year before the Plaintiff's

3

brother

had

sold

one

acre

(located

directly

to

the

east

of

Plaintiff's property) for approximately $12,000.00. (R. 48)
On Sunday, June 28, 1987, the Plaintiff was being visited by his
grandson's family. (R. 50)

The Defendant came to the Plaintiff's

home and a discussion involving the property took place around the
Plaintiff's

kitchen

table.

(R.

51)

The

Plaintiff's

relatives

remained in the living room. (R. 51)
At that meeting, the Defendant, Mr. Barter, indicated that he
wanted to close the deal and although the Plaintiff claims he had
some mental reservations, the Plaintiff told the Defendant he was
willing. (R. 52)
The agreement prepared by the Defendant was presented to the
Plaintiff and the parties both signed the agreement. (R. 53)

The

text of the agreement is as follows:
I, Clinton Barter, am giving Wilford Hooley $200.00 cash
earnest money for property located at 720 West 200 South,
Lindon, Utah, this 28th day of June, 1987. The remaining
balance of $19,800.00 for 3.36 acres due upon completion of
title search proving clear title to said property.
Buyer: s/Clinton J. Barter
Seller: s/Wilford Hooley

Date: 6/28/87
Date: 6/28/87

(R. 28)
The Plaintiff accepted, at the time of the execution of the
Agreement, Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) earnest money. (R. 54)
Plaintiff

conceded

that

the Defendant

4

at no

time

was

The

rude or

overbearing with the Plaintiff in the parties' negotiations or the
signing of the agreement. (R. 54-5)
It should be noted that during the week of negotiations, the
Plaintiff

did

not

attempt

to call

a real

estate

salesperson,

appraiser or lawyer with regard to the value of the property or any
other aspect of the transaction. (R. 56)
After the meeting on Sunday, June 28, 1987, with the Defendant,
the Plaintiff called his brother in Lindon, Utah and formed the
conclusion that he had sold the property for less than its value.
(R. 58)
The Plaintiff on June 28, 1987 then went to the home of the
Defendant to see if he would back out of the transaction (R. 58) and
was informed by the Defendant that he would not. (R. 59)
On Monday, June 29, 1987, the Plaintiff met with his attorney,
Dallas Young. (R. 59)

Mr. Dallas Young sent the Defendant a letter

with the Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) repudiating the contract as of
June 28, 1987. The Defendant, Mr. Barter, on July 2, 1987, returned
Mr. Young's letter to him together with the Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00).

(Addendum 1)

On June 29, 1987, the Defendant had his attorney, Franklin H.
Butterfield write the Plaintiff a letter, certified mail. (Addendum
2-3)
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In

conformity

with

the

letter

from

Mr.

Butterfield,

the

Defendant filed a Notice of Interest on June 29, 1987 (Addendum 4)
and within approximately one month, had the title work done on the
property. (Addendum 5-11)
After the discussion between the parties on June 28, 1987, the
Plaintiff and the Defendant had no further discussions. (R. 61)

The

Plaintiff, after talking with his brother and contacting his lawyer,
all of which was within one day of the agreement, repudiated the
contract

and

did not

intend

to close

the transaction with the

Defendant. (R. 63-5)
Finally,

from

June

28, 1987

to

the

time

the

Plaintiff's

deposition was taken, the Plaintiff did not undertake any further
action to determine the value of the property. (R. 72-3)
III
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The complaint was filed by the Plaintiff on February 2, 1989 (R.
1-3).

The Answer, Counterclaim

and Notice

Deposition were all filed on March 9, 1989.

of

the

Plaintiff's

(R. 5-12)

The Reply of the Counterclaim was filed by the Plaintiff on
April 10, 1989.

(R. 13-16)

An Amended Notice of Deposition was

filed by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's deposition on April 14,
1989. (R. 17-18)
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Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with accompanying
Memorandum

on November

9,

1989.

(R. 19-90)

Defendant

filed a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment on November 22, 1989. (R. 91-101)
The Honorable Ray M. Harding entered his Memorandum Decision on
the

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

on

January

2,

1990

granting

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-106)
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Findings with accompanying
memoranda on February 2, 1990. (R. 114-118)

The Plaintiff filed a

Motion

Amend

to

Strike

Defendant's

Motion

to

Findings

with

accompanying memoranda on January 16, 1990. (R. 110-112)
The Court entered its Memorandum Decision on the Defendant's
Motion to Amend the Findings on February 5, 1990.

By said Memorandum

Decision, the Court denied the Motion to Amend the Findings filed by
the Defendant. (R. 119)
The Court signed an Order prepared by counsel for the Plaintiff
on February 9, 1990 adjudicating the Agreement of June 28, 1987 as
unenforceable

and

of

no

further

force

and

effect

and

further

adjudicating the Notice of Interest filed by the Defendant in this
matter as an unenforceable interest. Finally, the Order prepared by
Plaintiff's counsel quieted title in the subject property in the
Plaintiff, free and clear of any claim of the Defendant. (R. 121-22)
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Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant on March 9, 1990.
(R. 123-124)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and in specifically failing to find that once a
party,

the

Plaintiff

herein, repudiated

the

contract, the non-

breaching party, the Defendant herein, was relieved from performing
and could pursue his remedies for breach of contract.
2.

The Court erred in failing to find that once anticipatory

repudiation has occurred, the Defendant in this matter was entitled
to bring suit on the contract at any time within the statutory period
of limitations.
3.

The

trial

court

erred

in

its

ruling

with

regard

to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in failing to make Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment specifically
reciting the facts relied upon in granting summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT REPUDIATED THE CONTRACT
WITH THE PLAINTIFF
The Doctrine

of Anticipatory

Repudiation

of

a contract is

accepted in nearly all American jurisdictions:
According to the general view prevailing now in nearly all
American jurisdictions, where there has been an
anticipatory breach of a contract by one party thereto, the
8

other party may treat the entire contract as broken and may
sue immediately for the breach. An anticipatory breach of
contract is one committed before the time has come when
there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome
of words of acts evincing an intention to refute
performance in the future. Such a breach precedes the time
prescribed for performance, or at least the time when
tender performance has been proffered. . . . . (emphasis
added).
17 Am.Jur. 2d, Contracts, Section 44, pp. 910-11.
The Restatement provides as follows;
Generally, a party acts at his peril if, insisting on what
he mistakenly believes to be his rights, he refuses to
perform his duty. His statement is a repudiation if the
threatened breach would, without more, have given the
injured party a claim for damages for total breach.
II Restatement (2d) of Contracts, Section 250, Comment (d) at 274
(1981).
Lastly, as expressed by Corbin:
If one party to a contract, either wilfully or by mistake,
demands of the other a performance to which he has no right
under the contract and states definitely that, unless his
demand is complied with, he will not render his promised
performance, an anticipatory breach has been committed.
Such a repudiation is conditional in character, it is true,
but the condition is a performance to which the repudiator
has no right. . .
Where the two contracting parties differ as to the
interpretation of the contract or as to its legal effects,
an offer to perform in accordance with his own
interpretation made by one of the parties is not in itself
an anticipatory breach.
In order to constitute such a
breach, the offer must be accompanied by clear
manifestation of intention not to perform in accordance
with any other interpretation.
4 Corbin on Contracts, Section 973 at 910-11 (1951).
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As applied to the facts of this case, there is no doubt that the
Plaintiff-Respondent

repudiated the contract*

The repudiation is

well documented in the Plaintiff's deposition, as set forth in the
Statement of Facts*

Within one day of the date he signed the

Agreement with the Defendant, the Plaintiff hired an attorney and
employed him to send a letter dated June 29, 1987 returning the
$200.00 earnest money and repudiating the contract. (R. 59-60)
The Plaintiff further indicated in response to the question as
to whether or not he would have responded to any request to close the
transaction, that he would not. (R. 64-65)
The issue as to whether or not the actions of the Plaintiff and
the

letter

written

by

Plaintiff's

anticipatory repudiation is moot.

counsel

constitutes

an

In the Plaintiff's Memorandum in

support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff states as
follows:
The next day after signing the agreement, Hooley expressed
to Barter his desire to repudiate the contract and return
to Barter's attorney (Butterfield) the $200.00 earnest
money.
(R. 23)
As one reads the deposition of the Plaintiff-Respondent Wilford
Hooley (R. 30-87), there leaves no question that within a day after
the signing the agreement with the Defendant, that the Plaintiff
personally went to the Defendant and through his attorney repudiated
the contract.
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POINT II
UTAH COURTS HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED THE DOCTRINE OF
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
The

recognition

in Utah

of

the

Doctrine

of

Anticipatory

Repudiation is documented in University Club v. Invesco, 29 Utah 2d
1, 504 P.2d (Utah 1972).

In that case, University Club, Inc. sued

its landlord, Invesco, Inc., to recover approximately $30,000 in
damages

incurred

because of the

system.

The lease expressly provided that the lessor (Invesco) would

furnish

adequate

air

failure of

conditioning

an air conditioning

and keep

it

approximately July 18, 1969, the system failed.
Invesco

to correct

the

situation, University

in repair.

On

After requesting
Club proceeded to

purchase an auxiliary air conditioning system.
Invesco

relied

upon

a clause

in the

lease

agreement which

provided that only if lessor (Invesco), failed to make any repairs
for a period of 30 days after written demand, could the lessor be
held in default.

Plaintiff, University Club, countered with proof

that it had served written demand for performance on the defendant
and had been informed by the defendant's manager that it would take
two to three months before the air conditioning system could be
replaced.

The Court, on appeal, stated as follows:

The recognized rule is where one party definitely indicates
that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a
contract, the other is not required to uselessly abide
time, but may act upon the breached condition. Indeed, in
11

appropriate circumstances, he ought to do so to mitigate
damages.
Id. at 30.
The Supreme Court had a chance to set forth the parameters of
the rule in Stanford Petroleum Co. v. Janssen, 209 P.2d 932 (Utah
1949).

In that action, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover

$1,000 paid to the defendant Janssen.

Defendant counterclaimed for

specific performance of a contract involving an assignment of an oil
lease.

The Court, in discussing the issues stated as follows:

The rule governing this phase of the appeal is stated in
Restatement of the Lav/, Contracts 1 A.L.I., Section 306,
which reads as follows: "where failure of the party to a
contract to perform a condition or a promise is induced by
a manifestation to him by the other party that he cannot or
will not substantially perform his own promise or that he
doubts whether though able he will do so, the duty of such
other party becomes independent of performance of the
condition or promise.
He has power to nullify his
manifestation of unwillingness or inability by retracting
it, so long as the former party, in reliance thereon, has
not changed his position.", (a) following such rule reads
as follows: a. No man is compelled to do a useless act,
and if performance of a condition will not be performed by
performance of the promise which is conditional, it is
useless for the intended purpose and it is therefore
unnecessary to perform the condition.
A promisee in
judging whether performance of the condition will not be
followed by performance of the promise is justified in
taking the other party at his word. . . .
Id. at 936.
In one of the earlier statements on the subject, the Supreme
Court again adopted the doctrine in Jordan v. Madsen, 252 P. 570
(Utah 1926).

The Court stated as follows:
12

It, of course, is well settled that a renunciation or
repudiation of the contract by one party before the time fixed
for performance constitutes a breach and gives an immediate
right of action to the adverse party.
[citing secondary
sources] It also is well settled that if one of the parties to
a contract notifies the other that he will not perform unless
such other assents to a material modification of the contract,
or by the addition of new terms, such conduct amounts to a
renunciation of the contract [citing secondary sources].
Id. at 573.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN FAILING TO FIND
AN ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION BY THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
In Judge Ray M. Harding's Memorandum Decision dated January 2,
1990, the trial court stated as follows:
The court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, will grant that Motion finding that the
Defendant, after agreeing to take responsibility for
completion of the contract, did not do so within a
reasonable period of time. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), Commercial Security Bank of Ogden
v. Johnson, 173 P.2d 277 (Utah 1946). Defendant has given
the Court no reason to excuse the delay in completing this
transaction. An unexplained delay of 19 months is not a
reasonable time.
The Court will therefore order
defendant's notice of interest removed and will hold the
earnest money agreement to be unenforceable.
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an order consistent
with the terms of this decision and submit to opposing
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
Court for signature.
(R. 105)
Defendant-Appellant

respectfully claims that the trial court

erred in its analysis of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
13

First, the Curt failed to make any finding as it relates to the
Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, and secondly, failed to make
any finding as to the impact of a repudiation on the DefendantAppellant's responsibility to go forward with his obligations under
the terms of the contract.
If one

reviews

the documents

relative

to the Motion

response

of

the

submitted

for Summary

to the trial court

Judgment, almost the entire

Defendant-Appellant

went

to

the

issue

of

the

anticipatory repudiation and its implication in the matter. (R. 91101)
Despite the fact that the Defendant-Appellant submitted to the
Court

the

rationale

and

authority

for the doctrine relating to

anticipatory repudiation, the Court did not mention the same in its
Memorandum Decision of January 2, 1990. (R. 105)

Instead, the Court

relied upon two cases for the doctrine of reasonable time to complete
one's obligations under a contract.

It is respectfully submitted

that neither case is on point with regard to the issues in this
matter.
In Bradford, supra, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
defendant seeking specific performance or damages for breach of an
earnest money agreement to convey the home to the plaintiff.

On

February 17, 1978, the plaintiffs made an offer to purchase the home
from the defendants using the standard earnest money receipt and
14

offer to purchase.

The offer was conditioned by the clause "Sale

subject to buyer obtaining financing (FHA)."

On February 22, 1978,

the defendants accepted the plaintiff's offer.

Although visiting a

financial institution, the plaintiffs did not file an application for
a loan.

In March 1979, the defendants conveyed their interest in the

subdivision to another entity.
company

A representative of the successor

informed the plaintiffs that because they had failed to

obtain financing within a reasonable time, the company would not
honor the earnest money
plaintiffs
institution.

submitted

agreement.
a

"loan

Finally, in July

commitment"

from

a

1979, the
financial

In discussing the issue, the Supreme Court found that

inasmuch as the plaintiffs were seeking equitable relief, it was
their burden to discharge their own obligations and that they did not
do so in a reasonable

period of time. Id. at 1242.

There is

absolutely no discussion in Bradford, supra relating to the Doctrine
of Anticipatory Repudiation and its effect upon the duties of the
non-breaching party.
The second case cited by Judge Harding was Commercial Security
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra. In that 1946 decision, the court
again simply dealt with the issue of reasonable time and defines it
as:
The contract did not specify the time in which the plant
was to be constructed and put into operation.
The law
implies (as all parties agree) that the plant was to be
constructed and put into operation within a reasonable
15

time. A "reasonable time" has been defined as: "so much
time as *is necessary, under the circumstances, to do
conveniently what the contract or duty require should be
done in a particular case." [Citing cases]
So much time as
diligent man to
requires should
possibility of
affected.

is necessary, for a reasonably prudent and
do, conveniently, what the contractor duty
be done, having a regard for the rights and
loss, if any, to the other party to be

Id. at 280-81.
In essence, the trial court avoided ruling upon the issue of
anticipatory
submits

repudiation

is documented

which,

Plaintiff-Appellant

by both parties

in this

respectfully

action.

It is

respectfully submitted that the Court's failure, to review the issue
of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation and rule on the same,
with sufficient detail to give the Court on Appeals an outline of the
mental process constitutes reversible error.
POINT IV
ONCE AN ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION HAS OCCURRED,
THE NON-BREACHING PARTY IS THEREAFTER RELIEVED FROM
ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION OF PERFORMANCE AND HAS A RIGHT TO
BRING SUIT FOR THE BREACH
The Arizona

Court

in United

California

Bank

v.

Prudential

Insurance Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390, 430 (Ariz. App. 1983) stated
as follows:
An anticipatory repudiation is a breach of contract giving
rise to a claim for damages and also excusing the necessity
for the non-breaching party to tender performance.
(citations omitted). A repudiating party is not entitled
to demand performance from the innocent party or use the
latterfs failure to tender as a defense as to the claimant.
16

As stated another way, tender is excused where a party
indicates that it will not be accepted because the law does
not require the non-breaching party to do a futile or
useless act.
(citations omitted).
Thus, to recover
damages for anticipatory breach, the injured party need
only show that he had the ability to perform his own
obligation under the agreement.
(Citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
United Cal Bank at 435-36.
The authors of one secondary

source specifically stated the

application of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation on the nonbreaching parties duty to respond as follows:
Nearly all the courts considering the question have reached
the conclusion that a renunciation or repudiation of a
contract before the time for performance, which amounts to
a refusal to perform it at any time, gives the adverse
party the option to treat the entire contract as broken and
to sue immediately for damages as for a total breach.
There is no necessity in such case for a tender of
performance, or compliance with conditions precedent, or
waiting for the time of performance to arrive, although
this is optional.
17 Am.Jur 2d Contracts, Sec. 449.
There is no question in this case on the same day the contract
was signed

and the day after, Mr. Hooley, the Plaintiff herein

repudiated the contract.

The case law and secondary sources are

clear, that once the repudiation has occurred, he has no further duty
to go forward.

Mr. Barter filed a Notice of Interest on the property

(Addendum 4) and in fact within thirty days completed a title search
(Addendum 5-11).

The assertion in the lower court that because Mr.

Barter, the Defendant herein did not have any further contact with
17

the Plaintiff, he was barred

from pursuing

the purchase of the

property is totally contrary to the authorities cited above.

The

fact that there was no further communication between the Plaintiff
and Defendant
evidence

after

that

repudiation.

the

the repudiation of the contract, is simply
Plaintiff-Respondent

never

withdrew

his

It is respectfully submitted that the facts of this

case as submitted for determination for the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment clearly indicate that upon the determination of
anticipatory repudiation, Mr. Barter had no further obligation to go
forward.
POINT V
ONCE THE ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION OCCURRED, DEFENDANT
WAS ENTITLED TO BRING SUIT AT ANY TIME WITHIN
THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-23 (1985 as amended) states:
Within six years:
(2) an action upon any contract,
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
Section
limitations.

78-12-22

grants

an eight-year

statutory

period of

In any event, the non-breaching party to a contract is

entitled to bring the suit within six years.

The Plaintiff was

advised by the letter from Butterfield of Defendant's intent the day
they were informed of the repudiation of the contract.

Ruling on the

Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Amend the Findings which again urged
the Court to review the issue of anticipatory repudiation, Judge
18

Harding ruled as follows on February 5, 1990, and in doing so stated
as follows:
The Court, having received Defendant's Motion to Amend
Findings will deny that Motion as there are no findings in
existence in this matter. It is not material whether there
was an anticipatory repudiation of this contract because
the alleged repudiation was not in writing, and Plaintiff's
time for performance had not yet arrived.
Defendant had
the obligation to pursue completion of the contract, and
the Court has ruled that he did not do so within a
reasonable time period.
(R. 119)
It is respectfully
regard

to the

performance.

submitted

application

that Judge Harding

of pursuing

the

action

erred with

for

specific

The sentence of Judge Harding's Decision that indicates

that it is not material whether there was an anticipatory repudiation
of the contract because the alleged repudiation was not in writing,
is clearly error.

There is nothing in Utah case law, the secondary

sources or otherwise that requires the repudiation to be in writing.
As indicated at the outset of this Brief, all that is necessary is a
statement

repudiating

a party's

obligations under the contract.

intent

to go

forward

with his

There is absolutely no authority,

known to the Defendant-Appellant that requires the repudiation to be
in writing.

However, even Plaintiff agrees that the letter from

Plaintiff's counsel on June 29, 1987 constituted a repudiation. (R.
23) Further, the statement in Judge Harding's Decision that because
Plaintiff's time for performance had not arrived, that the doctrine
19

was inapplicable.

The statement is a contradiction.

The Doctrine of

Anticipatory Repudiation expressly applies, as heretofore set out, to
a situation where a party repudiates his obligation to go forward
under the terms of the contract before his time to perform has
arrived under the contract. Finally, the Ruling as it relates to
"reasonable time" is inappropriate inasmuch as performance by Mr.
Barter was excused by the Plaintiff's anticipatory repudiation of the
contract.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION
The standard with regard to the granting of a Motion for Summary
Judgment was set out by the Court in Frisbee v. K & K Construction
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984).

The court stated as follows:

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that summary judgment is proper only where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It should be
granted only where it clearly appears that there is no
reasonable probability that the party moved against could
prevail. As this court explained the standard:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
If there is any doubt or
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing
party.
Thus, the court must evaluate all the
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment.
20

Id. at 389.

See also Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah

1982); Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah
1983).
In this case, it is respectfully submitted that the evidence is
clear and convincing that the Plaintiff repudiated the contract in
this matter.

It is upon that basis that the Defendant-Appellant

requests that the matter be reversed for entry of judgment on that
issue in favor of the Defendant.

However, certainly there is no way

that the deposition of Mr. Hooley, the Plaintiff herein, can be read
to support the proposition that there is no issue of fact as it
relates to his repudiation.

The Court simply failed to make any

specific findings as to the issue of repudiation and the conduct of
the parties and based thereon, the case law interpreting Rule 56
mandates that the case be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the
Court should reverse the Memorandum Decisions and Orders of Judge
Harding

in this matter.

evidence

is

It is respectfully

uncontroverted

as

to

the

submitted

issue

of

that the

anticipatory

repudiation and therefore, the Court should find, as a matter of law,
that the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation applies in this matter,
and that in fact the Plaintiff-Respondent did repudiate the contract,
thus,

leaving

for

determination
21

at

trial

the

issue

as to the

implementation of the specific performance requested by the Defendant
and rulings on tUte other relief requested by the Defendant-Appellant
in his Counterclaim.

DATED this l 5 clay of September, 1990.

MICHAEL K. BLACK, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUMS

On J u l y 2 , 1987 a t
o f f i c e of Da 1 1 a s a

i r I g I i I a 3 ] e 11 e

Barter

v

n,

2:V p.r

i ui \
HI

^~^

.-r.»or

Barter

- r - \M v h ^ -

I «l

broach'
V

-' s

-- t - .
i^cretaty

n *- _

Enclosed in the le:ier from. Mr. Young to Mr » Bart.::, and

returned I: :::: tl: :te • ::: f f ,:i c e :::: f I :.:::: ! ! c: i n :tg • ::: j :i • Ji :i]| ;; , 2

3 9 8 '3

o f S.2 00 . 0 0 , II! i:i : 1 oung was Dt in tl le office at the time c : the
delivery on July 2, 19 87.
Merle Nyman

-7T^-

vs

FEANKUNH.BUTTEEF1EI
KOWftMtOC

June t9 # 1967

IT. Vilford Boolay
klX W*st, >700 Hearth,
FTOYO, Utah 6U6UI4

Dear Sirt
Mr. Clinton Barter hks jast thie day consulted thia
office relative to an Ernest honey igreement he signed vitn you
for the purchasa of real aatata in lindon, Utah,

aaid agreenent

i s in writing, add there ia consideration passing firoa Buyer to
S*Her.

l e has f i l e d a Notice of late re rt i n the aubject property

ana i s arranging a t i t l e aesrch on ?&e property*
V^en that la done he *£Z1 aet vp an ^pointaent with
a t i t l e company t o close the traneartioru
Z have assured him tnat oe has complied vith a l l rafuire&emai
of Utah lav for t&e purchasa of ret* property, and that ahould you now
decide not to e e U tfce eubJect property for the prioe*e contained
In tne agreement* t b n Ha fcaa a aensorloua oauae of action far
Specific performance of a contract far the purchase of property.
I trust that this w i l l xot be necessary, and tnat your
attendance at the closing trill be forthcoming.

fery truly yours,

P H BUTTffiFULD./

P-xa? T72 323
P-l

' P O ^ CERTIFIED :VA!L

/

0

/2 "1.

SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 «rtan additional services are oeskad,afid complete hams 3 and 4

Put your address in the "RETURN
card from being rvturned to you,
delivered to and the date of
postmaster for seas and check
1 . O Shim to whom
3.Artidt

the reverse sloe. M h n a to do this will piavent this
He wilt provide you the name of the parson
thafolkaeiigasfiioasareeeeilehai cSnautt

-

1
\

^73~?* 5

—***—J—

Registered

c*rm*t

f L I Express Mail

B

Insured
COD

Always obtain signature of addressee or
•Oertf end DATE DELIVERED.

8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y if
requested and fee pmd)

7. Date of Delivery
H Form 3811. Feb* 1986

DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT

-3-

NOTICE Of ^IfBtESf jOT TtEAI TROFSSn

COUKTT OF UTAH

)

125L11* » 10i3* Aft FEE-, 3J$i

)

RECORDBJ FOR CLIKTOK J BARTER

TO VH3K I T MAT CONCERN

R o t i c e i s hereby g-./en that the undersigned has an i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n r e a l
property s t i u a t e d i n Ut*a County, S t a t e of Utah, described a* follows*
BEGINNING 7 . 4 4 CHADS EAST AND 0.50 CHAINS NORM OF
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER CF SECTION 3 3 , IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH,
.RANGE 2 EAST OF THE SAIT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, IN UTAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THENCE NORTH 372.24 FEET, THENCE
NCRIH 85 NEGREES 52 ME50TES 30 SECONDS EAST 4 8 5 . 5 FEET,
THENCE SOUTH 1 5 8 . 5 0 FET, THENCE SOOTH 40 DEGREES WEST
i$55&EET TO ROAD, THEtCE WEST 240 FEET TO THE PLACE OF
BEGINNING.
TOGETHER WITH ANY AND 2IL WATER RIGHTS APPURTENANT THEREUNn, AND
TOGETHER WITH ANY AID III, TIPROVEMENTS THEREUNTO BELONGING.

S a i d i n t e r e s t i s evidenced by a c e r t a i n EARNEST MONET SALES AGREEMENT
dated
28 JUNE 19E~
,\j and between VTILFjRD L. HOOLEY, TRUSTEE
(leller)
CF g g ygTLFOHD L . HOCLZZ FAMILY TRUST
(seller.)

s o S e l l e r s and t h e undersigned a s Buyers,

CLINTON J . B A F i & y " )

* * ^

Subscribed and sworn tc oefore me t h i s

29

day o f

JUKE

A.D., 19 87
**«&

„v.

Residing a t

PVTMVZ.

My Connnission Expires

, V^TyVrt

fc>

*~ ( — 9 0

..'I/V

Prepared for:

CLINTOL ^

IVliJlV

SCHEt LI II I-

\

FIDEL:^

375-62 H;

?

Policy o r P ' j i ' c e
(a)

•

~ be issued:

-ITLE

£

ALTA Ovi-s-s policy—

For-

— -.r73

S TB y

F-"oposec -sured:

CLINTON J ,

BARTER

(b) r- ALTA Stc* :ard Loan Policy.
P r 0 |. u ") c *-•"'

IJ t-'sUie oi i!

Coverage —1970

$

riirpfl

'V in im.' lar.f* described or refs-ed to in this Commitment and covered he -T - is:

• PEL
1" ;^e to said esta • or interest ir sa :

a- ' s a< the e'-'ecuve date hereof vested in:

WILFORD _
.___isx AND ZRI.IVi )\
iOOLEY FAMILY TRUST
Tnf- viii'- re*erre'
State o-

"OOLEY, TRUSTEES III

• •" rrns C-'virr tment is locatec -. the County of
and describe: as follows:

Mil

IIILJ.KD

UTAH

BEGINNING
,44 CHAINS EAST AND C.50 CHAINS NORTH OF THE SOUnHWEST
CORNER OF SECTION 3 3 , IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST : ? THE
SALT LAKE 3ASE AND M E R I D I A N , IN UTAH COUNTY, STATE 0 1 UTAH,
THENCE NORTH 3 7 2 . 2 4 F E E T ; THENCE NORTH 8 5 DEGREES 5 2 ' 32' EAST
4 8 5 . 5 F E E T - THENCE SOUTH 1 5 8 . 5 3 F E E T ; THENCE SOUTH 4 0 DI^REES
WEST 3 5 5 FEET TO ROAD? THENCE WEST 2 4 0 FEET TO THE PL.f.IE OF
BEGINNING.
NOTE:

LEGAL DOES NOT CLOSE

PROPERTY

AT'IiRESS:

7;'fl

WEST

,'i.lu

SOUTH,

l.INDON,

UTAH

H4t.ni/

SCHEDULE B-I

I. The following are the requirements to be complied with:
1. Instruments necessary to create the estate or interest to be rsured must be properly executed,
delivered and duly filed for record.
2. Payment of the consideration for the estate or interest to be h^red.
3. Payment of all taxes, charges, assessments, levied and assess*:: against subject premises, which
are due and payat'e.
4. Satisfactory eviderce should be had that improvements and/o 'epa'ns or alterations thereto are
completed; that contractor, subcontractors, labor and materialmen =re all paid.

5. PROVIDE SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECT PROPERTY DISCLOSING
FENCE LINES AND DEED LINES.
6.

RELEASE JUDGMENT OR PROVIDE NEW PRDPOSEI OWNER INSURED.

• ?lT>rvi *

..

^-^^ ^-^—
•-. * - u ^ will contain exceptionsi to the following matte-i unless the
w m « a t * * t m p o M d « t i o t h e aaHataction of ^ Company.
1. Defect., tens, aocumbranca.. advers* claims or other matters, if any created, first appt; r ng in the
public racortJs or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but pnor to the a? ~e the proposed Insured acquires for value of -ecord'the estate or interest or mortgage thereor revered by
this Commitment.
"Jaims of ?af • ? -• coss'-- Dub'ic r'ecorc'i
A '". , 0 • S e ' ' - p
li^es. shortage i area e^c r :3:: , , r r , ? n *s
c^r\z: -g of imets in bour
pro demerits
ot .e- D*" n d a r y or I:
on disputes
Any roadway or ease~e^r s m 'a<
3.T-rar or unct
any part
rrz^^n.
thereof not shown Dy the public re:
5. Any liens for labor, services, or r •
records.
6 Any titles or rights asserted by any:
ments, or other entities, to tidelastreams, lakes, bays, oceans, or g u u
lished or changed by the United Sta ~i

,3t.

' I

i 'nulls

lii

iii

•

shown

ncluding. but not limited to, parsers coroora*
or lands comprising the shores : oovems
lands beyond.the line of the harbc- ?r bulkhea Government or riparian rights if

'" Any unpatented mining claims; rest - r : ons 0! exceptions in patents or ~ a;-^ suance thereof; water rights, c l a i m i • titles to w a i n .
8. Community property, dov.er. courte: :' homestead rights, if any. of any socuse .
9. The lien of all taxes and assessme"
:r the year 19 . .g-y, and thereafter.

*e public
povern----gabie
- estabis-

10 Restrictive covenants a " r : t : - g the : • :e r ty above riesr ibed

11.
TAXES FOR 1 9 8 " WKIC:- ARF ACCRUING BUT N "T YE
PAYABLE.. TAXES FOR 1 9 8 6 HA ."£ BEEN PAID UNDER TAX SERJ
D - 1 2 2 8 - B IN THE AMOUNT OF : 5 0 5 . 9 6 .
SAID AMOUNT WAS P.
r n : : - ON LAND EVALUATION OF $ 3 7 , 5 8 5 . 0 0 WITH IMPROVEMENTS OF
135.02
THEREON.
12.
CITY

SUBJECT TO ANY AND AL
r:-F LTNDON,
LIN DON CI"""

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
REPORTS NONE.

LEVIED IY THE

13,
SUBJECT TO A
9 ^ 4 .r VT OVERLAP ON THE NORTHEAST TURNER
DECREASING TO A 6 . 4 6 6 FOOT :-AP THEN INCREASING TO A 36*46<T
OVERLAP AT THE 'SOUTHEAST CCPSER.
1 4 * --.-DECREE OF ANNULMENT LATED 0 8 JANUARY 1 9 8 1 EXECUTE!
BETWEEN KAREN BARTER,
AS PLAINTIFF AND CLINTON BART:
DEFENDANT/ UNDER C I V I L NO. £ 3 9 3 4 , RECORDED 0 8 JANUARY 1 9 8 ]
O F F I C I A L RECORDS, MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
THE DEFENDANT 1 ?
AMOUNT OF $ 1 5 0 , 0 0
THEREFOR.

" E

ARREA"? IN CHILD SUPPORT PAY* EN . ^ . , THE
' THAT "'HE P L A I N T I F F SHALL HAVE A JUIGMENT

15.
SECOND AMENDED DECEIT OF ANNULMENT DATED 0 6 ^ . ; 9 8 i
EXECUTED BY AND BETWEEN KA?.2N BARTER, AS P L A I N T I F F AND C IN TON
BARTER, AS DEFENDANT, UNDER ZIVIL NO. 5 3 9 3 4 , RECORDED P* w • ^ 8 1
IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS.
16.
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IVTED 25 JUNE 1982 EXECUlbu r: ^MFAC
DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION DBA AMFAC MECHANICAL SUPPLY COMF'OY, AS
PLAINTIFF, A G A I N S T CLINTON BARTER DBA C.B. *'iUMBI*3f AS
DEFENDANT, UNDER CIVIL NO. 60419, IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,-18.33,
TOGETHER WITH ATTORNEY'S FIZS IN THE SUM OF ?1, 200.00, RETORDED
19P- IN THE OFFICII RECORDS*

-7-

17.
WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 0 1 NOVEMBER 1 9 8 2 EXECUTED
BY AND I N FAVI? OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSI'.'.- OF UTAH, A G A I N S T
CLINTON J . BARTER AND D. B . PLUMBING, I N THE AMOUNT OF $ 1 0 3 . 7 1 ,
UNDER DOCKET J : D. A - 3 7 - 4 4 8 , RECORDED 0 3 NC"ZMBER 1 9 8 2 I N THE
O F F I C I A L RECOF.IS.
18.
WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 0 1 NC TMBER 1 9 8 2 EXECUTED
BY AND I N F A Y I - OF THE STATE TAX C O M M I S S I ' . : OF UTAH, A G A I N S T
C L I N T O N J . BAP7ZR AND D. B . P L U M B I N G , I N TKI AMOUNT OF $ 1 0 6 . 0 5 ,
UNDER DOCKET : I . A - 3 7 - 4 4 9 , RECORDED 0 3 NI ZMBER 1 9 8 2 I N THE
O F F I C I A L RECOF.I3.
19.
ORDER DATED 2 1 A P R I L 1 9 8 3 EXECUTED EV AND BETWEEN KAREN
BARTER, AS P L - I N T I F F AND CLINTON BARTER, '• :" DEFENDANT, UNDER
C I V I L NO. 5 3 9 1 - RECORDED 0 6 MAY 1 9 8 1 I N T - 1 O F F I C I A L RECORDS,
MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE P l - I N T I F F AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR I ELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT AS '.' A P R I L 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 I N
THE SUM OF $ 1 ,
i*0.00.
JUDGMENT I S ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF,
FC- A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FIE FOR THE USE AND
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IN THE SUM 07 3 1 5 0 . 0 0 , PLUS COURT
COST I N THE S I " OF $ 2 . 5 0 .
20.
ORDER DATED 2 8 AUGUST 1 9 8 5 EXECUTED E . AND BETWEEN KAREN
BARTER, AS P L A I N T I F F AND CLINTON BARTER, >..= DEFENDANT, UNDER
C I V I L NO. 5 3 9 3 ^
RECORDED 20 AUGUST 1 9 8 5 IN TEE OFFICIAL RECORDS.
A.
THAT DEFENDANT I S DELINQUENT IN THE PAYHIIT OF CHILD SUPPORT
TO AND INCLUIIN'G AUGUST 3 1 I N THE SUM CI $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 .
COURT
FURTHER -F-I-NDS-^SAT-WITH REGARD TO THE -J-UDGME-!" -PREVIOUSLY ENTERED
IN THE AMOUNT !7 $ 1 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 THAT $ 3 0 0 . 0 0 OF S - I I JUDGMENT HAS BEEN
PAID.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT C O M P L I E D WITH THE 7 R I 0 R ORDER OF THE
COURT WITH THE PAYMENT, THEREFORE P L A I N T I F F IS ALLOWED TO PURSUE
EXECUTION ON T-IVT JUDGMENT.
B.
COURT FINE.FEES AND ENTEF.5
COURT FURTHEF
COSTS FOR THIS

THAT THE SUM OF $ 2 0 0 . 0 0 I S 7IAS0NABLE ATTORNEY'S
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR SAID SUM. THE
ENTERS JUDGMENT I N THE SUM 17 $ 1 7 . 7 5 FOR COURT
PROCEEDING.

C.
COURT FINE 5 THAT THERE HAS BEEN ENTERED 1.' THE CIRCUIT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, 7-OVO DEPARTMENT, A JUDGMENT AI.AINST THE PLAINTIFF
I N FAVOR OF : = : H O S P I T A L S , I N C . , I N THE S . ! OF $ 1 , 0 8 1 . 5 7 FOR
MEDICAL EXPEKrZS RELATING TO THE CARE OF THE P A R T I E S ' MINOR
CHILD.
THE C0.7.T THEREFORE ORDERS PURSUANT TEE DECREE OF DIVORCE
THAT JUDGMENT IE ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFEKI \NT FOR ONE-HALF OF
SAID SUM WHICI-: I S THE AMOUNT OF $ 5 4 0 . 7 8 .
21.
WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 1 5 SEPTEMBER 1 9 8 6 EXECUTED
BY AND I N FAY! 7. OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSI:.-! OF UTAH, A G A I N S T
CLINTON BARTEI, IN THE AMOUNT OF $ 6 9 3 . 7 6 , UNIER DOCKET NO. S T - 8 6 ^
2 5 9 5 , RECORDEI 24 SEPTEMBER 1 9 8 6 IN THE O F F I I I A L RECORDS.
Q P\

2 1,
BOUNDARY A G R E E M E N T DA^JD J ? J A N U A R Y 1 9 8 7 F X E C U T F D
AND
BETWEEN THE WILFORD L . HOOLE FAMILY TRUST AND L O I S J . WILI ~^SON,
RECORDED 2 0 JANUARY 1 9 8 7 AS ? I T R Y NO. 2 2 5 8 TN p n i K ? 1 " 7 A n ">AGF
5 7 0 CF THF O F F I C I A L RECORDS,

Q
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VENDITIONS AND STIPUI

M

I

IMIV

1 . The term "mortgage/* when used herein, shal nclude deed of trust, trust deed, or other see* irity instn iment.
2. If the proposed Insured' has or acquires actus knowledge of any defect, lien,, encumbrance, adverse claim
or other matter affecting the estate or interer or mortgage thereon covered' by this Commitment other
than those shown in Schedule B hereof, an: shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in
writing, the Company shall be relieved frorr liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of
reliance hereon to the extent the Company is arejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the
proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires
actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter, the Company at
its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve
the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations
3. Liability of the Company undei this Commttrrent shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such
parties included under the definition of Insure! in the form of policy or policies committed for and only
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown r Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest
or mortgage thereon covered by this Commttrrent. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated
in Schedule A for the policy or policies commrred for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions,
the Conditions and Stipulations, and the Excluscns from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed
for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made i pan
of this Commitment except as expressly modmsi herein
4

Any action or actions or rights of action thar t i e proposed Insured may have or may bring against the
Company arising out of the status of the title ts the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon
covered by this Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment.

